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This paper aims to consider the conventional, analogue, mission planning process 
with the objective of identifying the decision making constraints and challenges for 
digitisation.  Prototypes of digital mission planning systems are beginning to be 
devised and demonstrated, but there has been concern expressed over the design of 
such systems which fail to understand and incorporate the human aspects of socio-
technical systems design.  Previous research has identified many of the potential 
pitfalls of failing to take Human Factors considerations into account as well as the 
multiplicity of constraints acting on the planners and planning process.  An analysis of 
mission planning in a Battle Group is presented, based on an observational study by 
the authors.  This study illustrates the efficiency of an analogue process which has 
evolved over many generations to form the Combat Estimate, a process that is 
mirrored by forces throughout the world.  The challenges for digitisation include 
ensuring that the mission planning process remains easy and involving, preserving the 
public nature of the products, encouraging the collaboration and cooperation of the 
planners, and maintaining the flexibility, adaptability and speed of the analogue 
planning process.  It is argued that digitisation should not become an additional 
constraint on mission planning. 
 
 
Introduction to mission planning 
Mission failure is often thought to be the result of poor mission planning (Levchuk et 
al., 2002), which places considerable demands on the planners and the planning 
process.  This observation is further confounded by the two general principles of 
warfare.  The first principle is that of the “fog of war” (i.e., the many uncertainties 
about the true nature of the environment - Clausewitz, 1832) and second the principle 
that “no battle plan survives contact with the enemy” (i.e., no matter how thorough 
the planning is, the enemy is unlikely to be compliant and may act in unpredictable 
ways - von Moltke, undated).  These three factors (i.e., the effects of uncertainty, the 
enemy and failure on mission planning) require the planning process to be robust, 
auditable and flexible.  Mission planning has to be a continuous, iterative and 
adaptable process, optimising mission goals, resources and constraints (Levchuck, 
2002).  Roth, et al. (2006) argue that the defining characteristic of command and 
control is the continual adaptation to a changing environment.  Constant change in the 
goals, priorities, scale of operations, information sources and systems being used 
means that the planning systems need to be extremely adaptable to cope with these 
changes.   According to Klein and Miller (1999) there are many constraints acting on 
mission planning, including scarcity of resources, time pressure, uncertainty of 
information, availability of expertise, and the structure of the tasks to be undertaken.  
Mission planning requires knowledge of the domain, objects in the domain and their 
relationships as well as the constraints acting on the domain, the objects and their 
relations (Kieweit, et al., 2005).   They also note that the planning cycles can range 
from a couple of hours to a few days depending upon the complexity of the situation 
and the time available.  Given all of the constraints acting on the planning process and the need for the plan to be continually revised and modified in the light of the enemy 
actions and changing situation, Klein and Miller (1999) argue that “simpler plans 
might allow better implementation and easier modification” (p. 219). This point is 
reinforced by Riley, et al. (2006) who assert that “Plans need to be simple, 
modifiable, flexible, and developed so that they are quickly and easily understood” 
(Ibid, p. 1143).   
 
Mission planning is an essential and integral part of battle management.  Although 
there are some differences within and between the armed services (and the coalition 
forces) in the way they go about mission planning, there are also some generally 
accepted aspects that all plans need to assess.  These invariants include: enemy 
strength, activity and assumed intentions, the goals of the mission, analysis of the 
constraints in the environment, the intent of the commander, developing courses of 
action, choosing a course of action, identifying resources requirements, synchronising 
the assets and actions, and identifying control measures.  A summary of the planning 
process for the United States Army may be found in Riley et al. (2006) and the 
Canadian Army may be found in Prefontaine  (2002).  Their description has much in 
common with land-based planning in the British Army, which is described in The 
Combat Estimate booklet (CAST, 2007). 
 
Observation of Mission Planning in a Battle Group 
The mission planning process has been observed by the authors at the Land Warfare 
Centre at Warminster in the United Kingdon and on training exercises in Germany.  
The observations at Warminster have been both as participant-observers and as 
normal observers.  This section describes the observed activities in the planning 
process following a Warning Order received from Brigade.  For the purpose of this 
analysis, only the conventional materials (whiteboards, maps, overlays, paper, 
flipcharts and staff officers’ notebooks) will be examined.  As Figure 1 shows, the 
planning is undertaken in a ‘public’ environment when various people contribute and 
all can view the products.  This ‘public’ nature of the products is particularly useful at 
the briefings, which encourages collaboration and cooperation.  It also helps to focus 
the planners’ minds on the important issues and the command intent. 
  
Figure 1 -  Battle Group Head Quarters – Public Planning Area (G5) 
 
The following vignette describes how a Battle Group Head Quarters was observed to 
conduct itself in the planning process.  Whilst other Battle Group Head Quarters 
might vary, the basic themes are likely to be similar in processes they follow and 
products they produce. 
 
Warning Order from Brigade arrived  
The Warning Order (WO) arrived and was handed to the Chief of Staff (CoS) who 
read the whole document first, highlighting relevant material for himself and the 
Company level. 
 
Chief of Staff (CoS) creates Company WO 
The WO was too detailed for Company level, so some editing by CoS was necessary, 
as well as the inclusion of some additional material to clarify the anticipated task 
requirements.  
 
Send WO to Companies  
The modified and edited WO was then sent to the companies below the Battle Group, 
so that they would have advanced notice of the intention of the orders when they 
arrived.  This gives them an opportunity to prepare in advance of the actual orders. 
 
Create planning timeline 
The CoS created a planning timeline for the production of a plan to defeat an assault 
team that had parachuted into their area.  There were two hours available to construct 
the plan (from 1300 to 1500), which allotted approximately 17 minutes per question 
(of the Combat Estimate’s 7 questions) as shown in Appendix 1.  The planning 
timeline was drawn on a flipchart.  The Combat Estimate is a planning process that has been developed over decades and is described in more detail in The Combat 
Estimate book issued by the Command and Staff Trainer organisation at the Land 
Warfare Centre in Warminster, UK (CAST, 2007).  The Combat Estimate has 7 main 
questions to guide planners through the process, namely: 
Q1.  What is the enemy doing and why? 
Q2.  What have been I told to do and why? 
Q3.  What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction 
must I give to develop my plan? 
Q4.  Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? 
Q5.  What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect? 
Q6.  Where and when do each of the actions take place in relation to 
each other? 
Q7.  What control measures do I need to impose? 
The activities that were observed in answering each of these questions are presented. 
 
Q1.  What is the enemy doing and why?  
Question 1 was undertaken by the Engineer and the Intelligence Officer in parallel 
with Question 2.  Key terrain features were marked on a transparent overlay placed on 
top of a map (such as slow-go areas like forests and rivers), as were the approximate 
disposition of the enemy forces and likely locations (using translucent stickers with 
the standard military symbols on them from APP-6A - NATO standardization 
agreement on Military Symbols for Land Based Systems), potential avenues of 
approach, and likely Courses of Action (CoA).  An example is shown in Appendix 2.  
In this case, it was thought that the enemy assault force was likely to try and meet up 
with the main armoured forces approaching from the West.  The enemy had landed in 
an area surrounded by forest which gave them some protection, although it was 
thought that they had not landed where they intended.  
 
Q2.  What have I been told to do and why?  
The CoS interpreted the orders from Brigade together with the Battle Group 
commander to complete the Mission Analysis.  Each line of the orders was read and 
the specified and implied tasks were deduced.  These were written by hand onto a 
whiteboard as shown in Appendix 3.  The Commander’s Critical Information 
Requirements (CCIRs – which are linked to the Decision Points in Questions 4 and 5) 
and Information Requests (IRs) were identified and noted for each task, when 
appropriate.  When the CCIRs/IRs had been derived, the CoS read them off the 
Mission Analysis whiteboard (expanding where necessary to improve intelligibility) 
to a clerk who typed them directly onto the Requests For Information (RFI) sheet.  
The requests were radioed up to Brigade and the responses were tracked on the 
whiteboard. 
 
Q3.  What effects do I want to have on the enemy? 
The Battle Group Commander then drew his required effects onto a flipchart as 
shown in Appendix 4.  Three effects were placed above the planning line (SCREEN, 
CLEAR and DEFEAT) and four effects were placed below the planning line 
(SCREEN, DEFEAT, GUARD and DEFEND).  The two SCREEN effects were 
placed to prevent the enemy from the West coming to the aid of the group who were 
being attacked.  The CLEAR effect was intended to remove any enemy from the 
forest, if they were there. The DEFEAT effect was intended to incapacitate the 
enemy.   
Q4.  Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? 
The CoS and Battle Group Commander worked on three COAs to achieve the 
Commander’s effects as shown in Appendix 5.  This was a very quick way to propose 
and compare three potential COAs in response to the Battle Group  Commander 
Effects Schematic (remembering that the planning timeline only allowed 17 minutes 
for each of the seven questions of the Combat Estimate).  Meanwhile the Engineer 
took the Battle Group Commander’s Effects Schematic and put the Effects onto the 
ground, using an acetate sheet on a paper map.  Each Effect became either a Named 
Area of Interest (NAI) or a Target Area of Interest (TAI).  Decision Points (DP) were 
placed between NAIs and TAIs.  The resultant overlay is called the Decision Support 
Overlay (DSO) as shown in Appendix 6.  It is worth noting that it took approximately 
15 minutes to construct the DSO on the TALC (by the Engineer).     
 
Q5.  What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?  
The Engineer then constructed the Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM) on 
paper, taking the NAIs, TAIs and DPs from the paper map and linking them to each 
other, their location and purpose, and the asset that would be used to achieve the 
effect.  There is a clear link between the NAIs, TAIs and on the hand-written 
flipchart, as shown in Appendix 7.  The manual production of the DSOM on the paper 
flipchart offers a process of checking the logic of the DSO, making sure that the 
NAIs, TAIs and DPs link together and that the assets are being deployed to best effect 
(i.e., relating each asset to a purpose as the columns are next to each other in the 
flipchart version of the DSOM).   
 
Q6.  When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?  
The CoS led the discussion of how the force elements would move together through 
the battle (through a mixture of forward recce (reconnaissance), mounted and 
dismounted troops, and armoured vehicles) with logistical support and coordinated 
indirect fire ahead of them (controlled by the fire control lines – see Q7).  This was 
enacted on the map from the start position to the end position to capture the 
synchronisation issues as shown in Appendix 8, which were recorded onto the 
Coordination Measures whiteboard as shown in Appendix 9.  The coordination 
measures were used as a precursor to the construction of the synchronisation matrix. 
 
Q7.  What control measures do I need to impose?  
The fire control measures were developed by the Battle Group Commander, to ensure 
that the indirect fire ordinance would not be placed on the advancing force elements, 
or beyond the boundaries of the Battle Group’s area.  Five fire control lines were 
drawn onto an overlay on the paper map and numbered one to five.  Each line was 
given a name, which was entered into the staff officer’s notebook against the number 
used on the overlay as shown in Appendix 10. The convention of naming phase lines 
was to ensure coordination between the force elements and indirect fire during the 
operational phase.  These activities form the battle plan for the Battle Group.  This 
plan is turned into orders for each of the Companies the Battle Group is directing.  
Any minor changes to the plan, such as a delay in the timings or a reallocation of a 
unit (which might become apparent from the updated CCIRs), will mean that a 
Fragmented Order (FRAGO) is issued to the relevant Company. 
 
Analysis of observed vignette and comparison of media used  The record of the media used in this vignette is presented in Table 1, which indicates 
a variety of media including paper, maps, overlays, whiteboards, flipcharts and staff 
notebooks (i.e., the shaded cells in Table 1).  Observation of the planning process 
suggests that the Combat Estimate method, media and products work well together.  
The plan was constructed within the two hour time frame, with only 17 minutes per 
question, and the staff officers had no difficulty using the conventional media.  No 
difficulties were noted working between media, such as taking the effects schematic 
(Q3) from the flipchart and COA (Q4) from the flip chart to produce the DSO (Q5) on 
an overlay.  Similarly there were no problems noted for taking the DSO (Q5) from the 
overlay to produce the DSOM (Q6) on a flipchart.  The point here is that translation 
between the media was straight-forward, as all media and products were available for 
the staff officers to use at all times.  The planning media and methods were not seen 
as a constraint on the planning process. 
 
 
Table 1 - Media used during the planning process 
Media / 
Products 








       
Planning 
time line 
      
Q1. BAE/TI          
Q2. Mission 
Analysis  
      
Q2. 
CCIRs/RFI 
      
Q3. Effects 
Schematic 
       
Q4. COA           
Q4. DSO          
Q5. DSOM           
Q6. 
Wargame 
        
Q6. Co-
ordination 
      
Q7.  Fire 
control 
        
 
The optimal choice of type and mode of communication within and between the cells 
in a HQ is likely to be heavily dependent on the activity conducted. For some 
activities a textual document or a graphical image is more appropriate than a spoken 
alternative or vice-versa. The stage of any activity is also likely to heavily influence 
the optimal communication approach.  Table 2 shows the degree of collaboration and 
cooperation required for different stages of the planning process. There is a clear divide; the latter stages of the process (Q4-Q7) are best supported by collaboration 
(actors working individually with shared information). The earlier stages are much 
better suited to cooperative activity where the actors work together on one single 
product.  Walker, et al. (2009) report on the basic human communication structures 
seen inside a BG HQ, identifying eight key functions, some of which are comprised of 
further sub-functions.  The eight key functions include the Higher Command 
Formation, the Battle Group Commander (CO), Chief of Staff (COS/2IC), the 
‘Principal’ Planning Staff such as the IO/G2 (to varying extents it also requires the 
participation of individual roles such as Recce/ISTAR, Eng, A2/Log and Arty/AD.  
There are also other ancillary command staff (such as those responsible for more 
general tasks and information management), which are called sub-units in the HQ 
(who are typically carrying out activities live in the battlespace) and, finally, the 
collection of graphics and planning aids derived from the Combat Estimate (artefacts 
that represent and transform information in some manner).   
 
Walker, et al. (2009) describe the human network as dynamic with different 
functional nodes and links becoming active under different activity stereotypes.  The 
activity stereotypes that they identified were: providing direction (i.e., the Battle 
Group Commander directing communications and information outwards to 
subordinate staff in a prescribed and tightly coupled manner); reviewing (i.e., the 
planning/principal staff communicate in a more collaborative manner with mutual 
exchange of information and ad-hoc usage of planning materials and outputs); and 
semi-autonomous working (i.e., the headquarters staff are working individually on 
assigned tasks and become relatively loosely coupled in terms of communication.   
 
Table 2 – Team work required for each stage of the planning process 
Digital MP/BM Estimate Question  Task work or team work 
Q1.  What is the enemy doing and 
why? 
Cooperative activity around the table 
Q2.  What have I been told to do and 
why? 
Isolated intellectual activity followed by 
collaborative activity around the table 
Q3.  What effects do I want to have 
on the enemy? 
Isolated intellectual activity followed by 
cooperative activity around the table 
Q4.  Where can I best accomplish 
each action/effect? 
Q5.  What resources do I need to 
accomplish each action/effect? 
Q6.  Where and when do the actions 
take place in relation to each other? 
Q7.  What control measures do I need 
to impose? 
Collaborative activity in which the 
products are shared 
 
The communication channels remain open but used in an ad-hoc, un-prescribed 
manner).  These basic structures account for most of the formal communications.  The 
human network structure is complex, but some of the links are identified in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2.  Relationships between the cells in Battle Group Head Quarters during 
mission planning 
 
As Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate, the process of mission planning is a collaborative 
(i.e., working together on planning products) and co-operative (i.e., working in 
parallel on planning products) process, both in terms of the contribution to the 
products and the verbal interactions.  It is also very obvious that the planning team 
surrounds themselves with the planning artefacts.  Maps, overlays, white-boards, and 
flip-charts adorn every surface.  The plan is constructed in the physical space between 
these artefacts, as information is collected, transformed and integrated from the 
cognitive artefacts and the interactions between the members the planning team.  The 
training that planners undergo reinforces the fact that the information needs to be 
‘public’, for all to see and interact with.  The planning process appears to focus on 
identifying the constraints (such as the mission, the enemy, the environment, the 
resources and assets) to help define the possible courses of action.  The process also 
requires an understanding of enemy doctrine and tactics to anticipate their likely 
behaviour and responses as well as military experience to know what effects are likely 
to achieve the desired outcome.  Although it is difficult to quantify, there is certainly 
the opportunity for creativity in the way in which the plan is constructed.  The 
planning team are continually trying to identify ways in which they can get the most 
from their finite resources and assets as well as preventing the enemy from 
anticipating their strategy.  The planning process is also required to be flexible, as the 
it is continuous – as the process of issuing FRAGOs suggests.  Whilst there hasn’t 
been the space to discuss the interaction between planning and operations, these two 
cells are tightly coupled, as operations ensure planning and re-planning is being 
undertaken in light of the operational demands and constraints. 
 
Implications for digitisation Moves have been made to develop digital systems to support the planning processes 
(see Riley, et al., 2006 and Roth, et al., 2006 for just two examples).  The focus of 
these activities has been on the products of the planning process for distribution 
between the planning team and to other people in the network within the HQ.  The 
challenge to system designers has been to preserve the collaborative, public and 
creative parts of the planning process as well as supporting different levels of plan 
fidelity (which will depend on the time available to develop the plan).  Perhaps the 
biggest challenge is to decide what needs to be digitised and what form this 
digitisation should take.  Given that military planning teams have invested 
considerable effort in developing and refining their planning skills using the 
traditional media, it would seem appropriate to try and support these activities rather 
than requiring them to develop a new set of skills.  The planning process has evolved 
over centuries of refinement and improvement (Clausewitz, 1832).  Roth, et al., 
argues that much insight may be gleaned from studying the work-arounds and home-
grown cognitive artefacts that are being used by command and control teams (such as 
the so-called ‘cheat-sheets’ and sticky notes).  The traditional analogue planning 
process (as described earlier) is certainly abundant with potential metaphors, such as 
overlays, stickies, routes, COAs and so on.  It is worth considering if the conventional 
media could be captured digitally (by camera, scanner, or other means) if they need to 
be transmitted as electronic documents with orders or reports, or for wider 
distribution.  As a general design principle, the production of electronic documents 
should be at least as easy as the production of their analogue equivalents.  Baxter 
(2005) is wary of the inexorable trend to digitise and concerned by the history of 
technology failing to deliver expected benefits, this is not just linked to military 
experience (Stanton and Marsden, 1996; Sinclair, 2007).  Baxter argues that very few 
people understand the interrelated issues for technology, operations and human 
factors (being conversant in just one of these topics is not sufficient).  
Transformational approaches are likely to cause more problems than they solve.  
There are concerns that digitisation will lead to additional ‘emergent’ work (Kuper & 
Giurelli, 2007), both in terms of increasing the amount of ‘direct’ work required as 
well as the work associated with operation of the digital tools.  The emergent nature 
of the task-artefact cycle has been described by Carroll (2000).  Certainly it will not 
be possible to predict all the ways in which any future system would be used, so it is 
important to make the system as flexible as possible so that users may adapt it to suit 
their purposes (Roth, et al., 2006).  Kiewiet, et al., (2005) noticed that there are 
marked differences in the planners’ domain knowledge, pointing out that group 
planning ensures an integrated approach rather than an overemphasis on one planner’s 
area of strength.  The social aspect of planning has not been lost on other researchers 
(Houghton, et al., 2006; Stanton, et al., 2006; Walker, et al., 2006; Jenkins, et al., 
2008).  The collaborative aspects of planning seem to be a key to successful mission 
planning.  As in the observational case study reported in this paper, Riley, et al., 
(2006) identified different cells contributed to the planning process, such as 
intelligence, operations, logistics, fire support, engineering and air defence.  Kuper & 
Giurelli (2007) argue that design of collaborative tools to support command and 
control teams is one of the keys to effective team work.  The case study presented by 
Riley, et al., (2006) shows how Human Factors can contribute to the design of a 
mission planning system which is based on a thorough understanding of the planning 
process, the demands and constraints.  In design of their prototype tools they stress the 
need to provide a quick visualisation of the plan and the current situation.  This 
enables the current operational picture to be compared with the plans, which may require changes to the plan as the situation changes (Stanton et al, 2008, a; Stanton, et 
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Appendix 1 - Planning timeline on a flipchart 
  
Appendix 2 - Threat integration on map and overlay 
 
 
































Appendix 6 - DSO on map and overlay 
 
 
Appendix 7 - DSOM on a flipchart  
   
Appendix 8 - Coordination of force elements on map and overlay via a wargame 
 
 






Appendix 10 - Fire control lines on map and overlay also recorded in staff officer’s 
notebook 
 